Repression of Kazakh Intellectuals as a Sign of Weakness of Russian Imperial Rule
The paradoxical impact of Governor A.N. Troinitskii on the Kazakh national movement*
La répression des intellectuels kazakhs ou la faiblesse de l'administration directe russe : l'impact paradoxal du gouverneur A.N. Trojnickij sur le mouvement national kazakh

Tomohiko Uyama 1
Although bureaucracy as an ideal type in Max Weber's concept is a form of impersonal rule, the personality of individual bureaucrats often influences the actual handling of administrative matters. While this holds true for today's developed countries, it held particularly so for tsarist Russia. In the Russian Empire's regions, governors-general and governors, entrusted by the will of the emperor to guard the inviolability of the autocracy's sovereign rights, 1 held discretionary administrative and judicial powers. They themselves often tried to carry out policies marked by their individuality. In the history of Russian Central Asia, it is well known that Konstantin von Kaufman, the first governor-general of Turkestan (1867-1882), dubbed "half-tsar" by the local population, behaved as a highly authoritarian, patriarchic and at the same time enlightening ruler, while his successor Mikhail Cherniaev (1882-1884) tried in vain to negate everything Kaufman did. 2 One may suppose that this kind of situation occurred typically right after the conquest and administration became more systematized later, but this paper demonstrates that personal factors in regional administration of Central Asia were still strong in the last years of tsarism, although of a different character than in the Kaufman era.
2 Among the objects of power exercised by governors were political and social activists, whose ranks mainly included intellectuals. Troinitskii was born in 1869 to an aristocratic family of elite officials. His father, Nikolai Aleksandrovich Troinitskii (1842 Troinitskii ( -1913 , after working as governor in Viatka and Riazan provinces, served as director of the central statistical committee and chairman of the statistical council at the Ministry of the Interior. He is known to historians as the editor of the volumes resulting from the first (and only) Russian Empire Census of 1897. Grandfather Aleksandr Grigor´evich Troinitskii (1807-1871) was also a famous statistician who played a leading role in the development and reorganization of statistical agencies during Russia's Great Reforms, and served as deputy minister of the Interior. 5 As Don Rowney argues, statistics was one of the most important instruments of legibility (the modern state's detailed grasp of the social, demographic and economic characteristics of the societies which it serves or rules) that were becoming available to the tsarist state, and statistical agencies expanded proportionately to the need to gather accurate and comprehensive information on commerce and agriculture. 6 Troinitskii's father and grandfather were thus among the bureaucrats who played a crucial part in the modernization of the tsarist state. Earlier, the governors of Aqmola (Akmolinsk), Semipalatinsk, and Torghay (Turgai) oblasts were called military governors, and army generals and officers were appointed to these posts. But an amendment to the statute for the administration of the Steppe oblasts in 1908 changed these military governorships to ordinary ones, and Troinitskii became the first civilian to work as Semipalatinsk governor. 9 The change from military to civilian rule might seem to indicate relaxation of control, but the fact was the opposite. 5 Troinitskii's tenure in Semipalatinsk coincided with a crucial period of the political and cultural history of Kazakhstan. While prominent Russian-educated Kazakh intellectuals first appeared as early as the mid-nineteenth century (most notably, Shoqan Wälikhanov and Ibrahim Altïnsarin), and the stratum of culturally active intellectuals was formed toward the end of the century, 10 it was during the Revolution of 1905 that Kazakhs began their political activities in earnest. They organized demonstrations and rallies in various cities and towns, and among others, the rally of June 1905 in Qarqaraly (Semipalatinsk oblast) adopted a petition, signed by 12,767 people, criticizing the government's interference into religious affairs and the policy of Russification and colonization.
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A number of intellectuals, including the future leader of the Alash Orda autonomous government, Älikhan Bökeykhanov (1866 ?-1937), were elected to the First and Second State Dumas. In June 1907, however, the Kazakhs and other Central Asians were deprived of voting rights to the State Duma, and the Russian authorities strengthened pressure on political activists. Kazakh intellectuals temporarily waned, but soon revitalized their cultural and social activities with political connotations : the number of books in Kazakh rapidly grew, 12 and the magazine Ay-qap (1911) (1912) (1913) (1914) (1915) In this paper, we begin by describing the repression of Kazakh intellectuals under Troinitskii and their reactions. Then we scrutinize Troinitskii's ideas, perceptions, and personality through his official reports and personal letters. Through these examinations, we aim at elucidating the mechanism of repression, in which personal and systemic factors intertwined and which reflected generally segregated but partly collusive relations between the Russian bureaucracy and Kazakh society. Finally, the paper demonstrates the paradoxical effects of repression on the Kazakh national movement.
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As other papers of this volume show, studies of Kazakh officials have recently been developing, but curiously enough, researchers still know little about Russian higher officials in the Kazakh Steppe, and this paper aims at filling this blank. We also use sources related to Troinitskii's previous workplace, Tobol´sk province, both because his experiences there are important for understanding his activities in Semipalatinsk, and the administrative institutions and practices in the Kazakh Steppe were closely related to those of Siberia -unofficially, Aqmola and Semipalatinsk oblasts were often called Siberia. This paper is an attempt to connect the history of the Kazakh Steppe with Siberian and Russian imperial history, at the same time underlining the agency of Kazakhs themselves.
The case of Aqbaev : The persecuting governor and the petitioning intellectual 8 The first major case of repression was that of Yaqub Aqbaev, a lawyer who graduated from the faculty of law of St. Petersburg University in 1903 and worked at the Omsk appellate court (sudebnaia palata) and other judicial organs until his resignation in November 1905. During the 1905 Revolution, he actively participated in demonstrations and writing petitions to the tsar and the government, including the above-mentioned Qarqaraly petition. He especially became famous by his enthusiastic speeches at rallies in Pavlodar and Qarqaraly in November. After being arrested but acquitted in 1906, he worked as an assistant attorney (pomoshchnik prisiazhnogo poverennogo), writing solicitations and complaints to the authorities on behalf of local residents. 13 
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In November 1908, Troinitskii wrote to the governor-general of the Steppe, Evgenii Shmit, 14 that Aqbaev, appealing to people for disobedience to power, behaved like a mini-tsar (tsarëk) of the steppe, which could be seen as a sign of weakness of power to the "semi-barbaric" inhabitants and was especially dangerous for a region bordering China. He asked the governor-general to banish Aqbaev to a remote corner of Aqmola oblast and then to request the minister of the Interior to banish him to a faraway province in Siberia for five years. Responding to this request, the governor-general banished Aqbaev to Omsk uezd (district) in Aqmola oblast (not a remote place, actually) and asked the minister to further banish him to Yakut oblast. The minister, however, decided to let him live under surveillance in a place he selected except St. Petersburg, Moscow and the capital provinces as well as the Governor-Generalship of the Steppe (Semipalatinsk and Aqmola oblasts) for two years. Aqbaev left Omsk in February 1909 and headed to Qapal in Semirech´e oblast. 15 This means that he went to a Kazakh town much closer to the Chinese border than his native Qarqaraly, despite Troinitskii's argument about the danger of his presence in a border region.
10 Versed in Russian law and with high political awareness, Aqbaev was not silent. Just then, an inspection was going on led by Count Pahlen for the purpose of reforming the administration of the Turkestan region including Semirech´e, 16 and Aqbaev sent Pahlen a long petition of seventy-three pages in April 1909. 17 He thought that he had been banished because of secret denunciations by local officials, including a former peasant captain (krest´ianskii nachal´nik -see below about this position) -Tsylov, a tax inspector -Panfilov, a former interpreter for the uezd police office -Bekmetev, the secretary of the uezd peasant captains' conference -Chanchikov, and a number of volost (canton) heads, who resented his exposure of their wrongdoings. Aqbaev described their corruption and dissolute life in detail, in a garrulous manner. He specifically pointed out systemic corruption related to elections of volost heads : candidates (Kazakhs) bribed the peasant captain (usually a Russian) and his companions, and they together manipulated the numbers of voters and vote results. 18 11 Aqbaev also believed that Troinitskii used the secret denunciations only as a pretext and that the real reasons for the banishment were his complaint against Filippov, whom Troinitskii invited from Tobol´sk province to the post of peasant captain as the successor to fired Tsylov, 19 as well as Aqbaev's political influence in local society. He noted insightfully that if the Semipalatinsk governor had been General Galkin (Troinitskii's predecessor), 20 he would have lived peacefully at home and would not have dreamt of becoming a candidate for exile to Yakut oblast. He sarcastically noted that it was clear that he had fallen victim to a "fetishistic" need for maintaining the prestige of power. 12 The petition, which Aqbaev wrote with abundant vocabulary and such extravagant expressions as "believing in the ultimate triumph of the moral unity of humankind on the basis of the teachings of Jesus Christ" (although he was apparently a Muslim) in order to appeal to the sense of justice of the Russian state, proved ineffective. Semipalatinsk oblast was not an object of Pahlen's inspection, and the petition was forwarded and entrusted for handling to Troinitskii through the governor-general of the Steppe. Troinitskii sent inquiries to the officials named in Aqbaev's petition, who naturally denied the accusations. It is noteworthy, however, that Kamenshchikov, a former chief of Qarqaraly uezd, confessed that Abdul-Azii Bekmetev -the police interpreter who was a relative of Aqbaev's wife and whom Aqbaev named as one of his slanderers -was his secret agent. Bekmetev, a member of a reputed Tatar merchant family in Qarqaraly, was formally a sympathizer of the Constitutional Democratic Party (Kadets), but fearful of being banished by the uezd chief, became his agent and began to provide information against Aqbaev.
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Here we can observe how officials exploited complex human relationships in local society and fear of oppression to collect information and frame up politically troublesome people. 13 Aqbaev and his family did not give up. From the beginning, his mother and wife petitioned to the governor-general not to banish him, the only breadwinner of the family and a sick person, to no avail.
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When Aqbaev was banished to Omsk uezd, they wrote to Aqmola governor that he had been victimized by false denunciation by Kazakhs supported by some chief officials, arguing, "Your Excellency knows the morals of steppe Kazakhs down to the smallest details and the value of their denunciations and slanders." The cases of Baytŭrsïnov, Tögísov, and Dulatov : Different interactions and different results 15 When Aqbaev was still in the middle of his struggle for returning home, in July 1909, another prominent intellectual, Akhmet Baytŭrsïnov was arrested in Qarqaraly. A poet and former school principal, he was accused of anti-government agitation and separatism. His wife wrote to the governor-general of the Steppe that he must have been arrested on the basis of false information given to the authorities by Kazakhs motivated by factional feud, and asked the governor-general to put her husband on trial promptly if he was a criminal, otherwise release him. Troinitskii, however, objected to the release. Baytŭrsïnov's alleged wrongdoings, enumerated by the governor, were the following : he had launched a campaign for the return of Aqbaev ; he propagated the idea of autonomy, claiming that China and Afghanistan would support Kazakhs if they stood up ; he told Kazakhs that Russians were not worth fearing, as only Cossacks had remained loyal to the tsar ; he instigated people not to pay taxes ; he tried to instill hostility between the Russians and the Kazakhs. arrest him in revenge for the dismissal of Chernavin, a peasant captain against whom Tögísov had brought a charge to the governor-general.
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18 Troinitskii, in the meantime, wrote to Shmit that Tögísov, connected with "extreme-left parties" and reputed as an influential and omnipotent man among the "dark masses," had committed crimes such as instigation of land disputes and non-payment of taxes, obstruction to settlement of Russian migrant peasants and sedentarization of Kazakh nomads, and applications for Chinese citizenship. In evidence of Tögísov's threat to social order, Troinitskii referred to the resolutions of Kazakh and Cossack residents to deport him. Practically accusing Shmit, Troinitskii also noted that Tögísov's prestige had especially increased after the governor-general fired Chernavin in response to his complaint. Emphasizing the dangers Tögísov could cause in the oblast bordering China, including even the possibility of an armed revolt of Kazakhs, Troinitskii asked Shmit to request the minister of the Interior to exile him to Yakut oblast for five years, as banishment to Semirech´e or Aqmola oblast was useless (he probably had in mind Aqbaev's case).
32 19 Troinitskii apparently expected that his enumeration of Tögísov's activities that posed a threat to Russian rule, security, and the prioritized policy of Russian peasant resettlement would be convincing for higher officials but he was mistaken this time. The governor-general of the Steppe ordered Tögísov's release in November 1909 on the grounds that the case was dismissed for lack of evidence. The order was apparently issued pursuant to a petition that a Cossack sent to the minister of the Interior. This Cossack was one of the initiators of a village meeting resolution that Tögísov be deported -a resolution that Troinitskii used as a key argument for his banishment. However, the Cossack asked the minister to invalidate the resolution because he had been deceived by the peasant captain Kholmskii, who boasted that he could easily influence his friend's, Troinitskii's, judgment -a friend with whom he had worked and drunk in the past. Tögísov, in turn, also sent a petition to the minister of the Interior in which he suggested that Troinitskii's judgment was biased, stating that if the latter and Kholmskii were indeed good friends, "I do not expect any mercy from Mr. Troinitskii. Therefore I humbly ask Your Excellency to immediately deport me from Semipalatinsk oblast," and repeated, "I am not guilty." Troinitskii asserted that the Cossack and Tögísov had teamed up in the prison where they both sat, but could not change the governor-general's order. Kazakh intellectuals and their families actively petitioned to the authorities and sometimes could win some officials' sympathy. They commonly argued that the arrests were based on false information (even appealing to officials' stereotyped notion about the Kazakhs' inclination to factional strife and slander), and noted Troinitskii's key role in oppression. People he targeted could not entirely escape oppression, but there were also legal mechanisms and human factors that mitigated it to some extent.
Entanglement of bureaucracy and Kazakh society, and Troinitskii's experiences in Tobol´sk 24
Complicated processes and different results of the persecution of Kazakh intellectuals reflected the characteristics of bureaucratism in late imperial Russia. On one hand, there still remained ample scope for administrative discretion. As Jane Burbank puts it, the "manipulation of rights was a foundation of Russian administrative practice and a characteristic behavior of even humble bureaucrats," 40 and satisfaction or rejection of petitions (a major tool in Russia for the rulers to learn the needs of the people and for the ruled to address grievances 41 ) much depended on individual officials, so Troinitskii could strongly affect the fates of the inhabitants of the oblast. On the other hand, final decisions on more or less important matters needed approval of higher officials (in this case, the governor-general) and the central office of the ministry. Bureaucratic principles of procedure (not necessarily corresponding to principles of rule of law) and collective common sense could sometimes prevent unfounded or unlawful persecutions. 25 Dependence of the level of persecutions on the individual characters of the governors, and especially the stark change that occurred when Troinitskii replaced Galkin (as 28 Konshin also noted that in contrast to Galkin, Troinitskii had been known as an "enemy of liberation movements" since his tenure as vice-governor of Tobol´sk province, 45 and cracked down not only on Kazakhs but also on liberals among Russian former exiles in Semipalatinsk oblast. For example, enraged at seeing a curtain with the inscription "Long live liberty" and quotations from the October Manifesto in the people's house of Ust-Kamenogorsk, Troinitskii ordered the police to burn the curtain and branded the city as a nest of revolutionaries in his explanatory note to the police department of the Ministry of the Interior, although Governor-General Shmit pointed out the absence of facts proving Troinitskii's assertion. Numerous police officers he brought from Tobol´sk to Semipalatinsk framed up innocent people and engaged in bribery, torture and rape ; this was especially the case in the investigation department (sysknoe otdelenie) opened in 1909 by Troinitskii's efforts. Vice-governor Grigorii Abaza investigated the offenses despite obstructions, and the police officers were put on trial and sentenced to imprisonment. Konshin also referred to Troinitskii's abomination during drinking and his relations with women. 46 29 As petitions of persecuted Kazakh intellectuals show, the police often used secret denunciations by local people, whose motives were entangled with complex human relations in Kazakh society aggravated by elections. The institution of popularly elected heads of volosts and villages as well as judges in customary courts was introduced in Central Asia in the late 1860s, on the model of a similar institution introduced in Russian rural areas some years earlier by the Great Reforms, but elections soon became the venue of factional strife and vote buying. 1889 to supervise rural administration and judiciary in an uchastok (subdivision of an uezd). Peasant captains, introduced in Siberia in 1898, had broader administrativealthough narrower judicial -powers (and more opportunities for corruption) than land captains, and substantially undermined peasant self-administration. In ethnically mixed areas, they supervised both natives and Russians (including a large number of new immigrants), reflecting the aim of this institution to unify the ethnically divided administrative systems and to promote Russification (obrusenie) and colonization.
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Maksim Taube, the governor-general of the Steppe, repeatedly requested the tsar in his annual reports for 1897, 1898, and 1899 to extend the institution of land captains to the Steppe oblasts, 49 and peasant captains were finally introduced in Aqmola, Semipalatinsk, Torghay, and Ural´sk oblasts in 1902. 31 The system of appointment of land captains from among the local nobility was not applicable to peasant captains because of the lack of landed nobility in Siberia and the Kazakh Steppe. While in Western Siberia the majority of the peasant captains were former officials for peasant affairs (chinovnik po krest´ianskim delam) and presumably knew the region well, many of the peasant captains in Eastern Siberia came from European Russia, often to make easy money or to escape from debt. 50 Although we do not have collective biographical data of peasant captains in the Steppe oblasts, we can well assume that the situation was similar to Eastern Siberia due to the absence of former officials for peasant affairs (except Aqmola oblast, where this position was introduced in 1894 51 ). According to Aqbaev, the peasant captain Tsylov was a former officer of the St. Petersburg river police, 52 and Tögísov's petition suggests that the peasant captain Kholmskii had worked with Troinitskii in Tobol´sk or some other place. It is easy to imagine that Troinitskii's use of people with material interests but few knowledge of the region as his agents in localities aggravated corruption and mismanagement. 32 Troinitskii was a strong advocate of the institution of peasant captains even before coming to Semipalatinsk. When local committees under the Special Conference on the Needs of Agricultural Industry were organized almost all over the Russian Empire by the initiative of Finance Minister Sergei Witte in 1902-1903, the Tobol´sk province committee recommended, among others, introduction of zemstvos (local self-government bodies) and a halt of peasant captains' interference in economic and agricultural activities of rural communities. Officials and experts pointed out that many peasant captains were not versed in agricultural management and their interference damaged initiatives of peasants and rural communities, and that the work of peasant captains depended too much on their individual zeal and preferences, without guarantee of continuity of their undertakings after personnel changes. However, Troinitskii dissented, writing that zemstvos were not suitable to Tobol´sk province, where peasants were illiterate and underdeveloped, and would be dominated by wealthy peasants and extortioners (kulaki i miroedy) ; land and peasant captains, possessing firm power and being close to the people, had a mission to take care of peasants, who had been deprived of the landlords' care after the Emancipation Reform of 1861 and left prey of extortioners. He claimed that land captains were useful even for highly developed peasants in Stavropol´ province, where he worked previously. 53 Judging from the digest of the local committees' works by the statistician Aleksandr Kaufman, Troinitskii's opinion on these two issues were minor not only in Tobol´sk province but in the whole Siberia. Governor Aleksandr Lappo-Starzhenetskii, Troinitskii had to cope with demonstrations, strikes, and peasant and prison disturbances as acting governor, and was also appointed acting temporary governor-general in four uezds of the oblast where martial law was imposed in December 1905. 55 He strongly relied on coercion and repeatedly asked the army for permission to use local military units and dispatch of new troops, expressing his intention of "vigorous suppression of the riots that are disturbing the entire city under my personal leadership." After the new governor, Nikolai Gondatti, 56 arrived in April 1906, Troinitskii continued efforts to suppress disorder under the governor's direction. 57 Troinitskii's ideas, perceptions, and emotions seen from his reports and letters 34 In this section, we further explore perceptions and ideas that formed the background to Troinitskii's relentless persecution of Kazakh intellectuals. First, we examine his annual reports to the emperor to learn his policy and view of the situation of the oblast.
35 In his reports, Troinitskii repeatedly wrote about the necessity of increasing Russian immigrants in order to strengthen "Russian elements" in Semipalatinsk oblast, a border region, and also of promoting the settlement of Kazakh nomads. This was in line with the state's policy (especially under Pëtr Stolypin) of promoting peasant migration aimed at resolving land shortage in central Russia and spatial Russification of Central Asia, and of confiscating the nomads' land for distribution to immigrants. Troinitskii's perception of the particular importance of this policy in border regions served as a basis for his assertion that people like Tögísov who could hinder settlement and immigration had to be exiled.
36 His perception of the necessity of strengthening "Russian elements" in border regions was also linked with his distrust of the Kazakhs, an "insidious and hostile people." According to him, they tended to take sides with winners in international conflicts as observed during the Russo-Japanese War, 58 had repeatedly migrated between Russia and China, and were totally untrustworthy as inhabitants of border regions. He thought that the situation would completely change if a solid network of Russian villages, whose residents would carefully monitor the movement of enemy forces, would cover the border with China. "Russian simple peasants from among immigrants are well aware of all the importance of populating border zones, and understand that this is a matter of state importance," he wrote, clearly showing his perception of a great difference between ethnic Russians and Kazakhs in their consciousness of belonging to the Russian state. rather absence of police." 62 Troinitskii and other high officials in the Steppe oblasts repeatedly requested the central government to increase the police and administrative personnel, 63 but the increase was slow. Troinitskii's lack of confidence in his own governing ability seems to have strengthened his attitude to crack down on every more or less suspicious person. 39 At the same time, he thought it desirable to settle Kazakhs and introduce to them the same administrative and judicial systems as Russians. This policy was not based on egalitarianism but aimed at eliminating "savage customs" and institutions such as the customary law courts, which the Russian government had earlier established taking Kazakh specificities into consideration. He wrote, 41 Aside from Troinitskii's views expressed in official documents, we can hear his candid voice in his personal letters to his parents (in most cases, father, who was then a senator and the chairman of the statistical council at the Ministry of the Interior), kept in the Russian State Historical Archives (RGIA) in St. Petersburg. In the letters beginning with "Dear Papa," or "Dear Mama," and ending with "The son who loves you," he repeated, "I struggle like a squirrel in a wheel," "I don't see help from anyone," and "I have to work all alone" despite a tremendous amount of work, because of his subordinates' laziness. He especially vilified Vice-Governor Abaza ("an idle bastard," "busy with love affairs and office intrigues"), 67 whom he repeatedly attempted to transfer outside the oblast. 68 In his memoirs, Konshin states that Abaza investigated misdeeds by police officers working closely with the governor. Thus, what likely motivated Troinitskii's hatred for Abaza was not so much the vice-governor's laziness as the fact that his investigation threatened to undermine Troinitskii's position. 42 Troinitskii was also discontent with his superior Shmit and the Governor-Generalship of the Steppe, which "terribly hinders the development of [our oblast]. It brings no benefit but slows down and stops all affairs." The view of governor-generalships as an unnecessary administrative layer between the central government and the provinces (or oblasts) was widespread in the late tsarist period, and the Governor-Generalship of the Steppe, composed of only two oblasts (Aqmola and Semipalatinsk) after Semirech´e was transferred to the Turkestan Governor-Generalship in 1899, was especially vulnerable to criticism. Many Russian officials and Kazakh intellectuals would have sympathized with Troinitskii when he complained in January 1910, "I had to write a lot of papers for him [the governor-general], to tell the truth, against myself, to show the raison d'être of his governor-generalship." ministry he belonged to : while the Ministry of the Interior under Dmitrii Sipiagin (1900-1902) argued for abolishing the Governor-Generalship of the Steppe, the ministry under Stolypin (1906 Stolypin ( -1911 , who preferred decentralization of state administration, advocated its preservation and opposed deputies at the State Duma who began discussing its abolishment in 1908. 70 Therefore, Troinitskii must have actually done the paperwork about the governor-generalship's raison d'être not only for Shmit but also for the ministry. 43 In addition, Troinitskii seemed to have a personal contempt and dislike for Shmit, despite both being rightists close to the Black Hundreds. 71 Accompanying the governor-general in inspection tours upset him : "For two days I had to listen to all sorts of nasty things, so I was compelled to stop him rather sharply." Moreover, a traditional pattern of civilian-military conflict could be observed in the relations between the two. When in 1913 an attempt of invasion of the Chinese territory by a Cossack unit failed and the Russian army had to dispatch troops through slush to confront Chinese cavalry on the border, Troinitskii complained to his father, If they had attached importance to my reports [about the necessity to strengthen the garrison in Zaysan uezd] in due time, there should not have been such a stupid situation, but the military cannot bear civilians to touch on military issues. 72 44 His letters also reveal his prejudices against various groups of people. He wrote, "Cossacks are terribly lazy. All the Irtysh [River] belongs to them, but they even feel tiring to catch fish." 73 He boastfully depicted his diplomatic discourtesy and contempt for foreign cultures when a former Chinese governor-general visited him in July 1912.
Yesterday a Chinese dignitary came to me and brought gifts -five fox pelts, in addition to different small items, for instance, Egyptian cigarettes. He was very surprised when I flatly refused to receive the pelts. I had to make gifts also for the small items. How savage their customs are. When I paid a return visit and brought him my gifts, he served me excellent tea but put there marmalade with his own fingers, so I had to ask another cup, saying that the doctor has forbidden me to drink sweet tea. 74 45 For Troinitskii, who was dissatisfied by everything in Semipalatinsk, including even hot weather, 75 the dream was to be transferred to central Russia. As early as September 1909, one and a half year after his appointment, he wrote to his father, Since I have to fight with the shortage of laborious people, sometimes appears to me a thought, isn't it better to abandon this savage land and ask for [a transfer to] European Russia.
[…] It is high time for me to be closer to you. Stolypin's government about Troinitskii's unlawful police operations and oppression of Kazakhs, "Petersburg officials, occasionally stopping at Semipalatinsk for inspection, on their return spoke about the Semipalatinsk governor as the nicest of persons, far from politics and retaining all the freshness of youthful views." 80 49 Overall, Troinitskii's reports and letters suggest that his relentless and aggressive attitude to Kazakh intellectuals was related to his dissatisfaction with his own circumstances, his contempt and lack of understanding of different peoples and cultures, and his anxiety about insufficient penetration of administrative and police power into local society. It is possible that he wanted his oppression of politically active people to appear as an achievement meriting his transfer to European Russia. He was a despotic administrator, but of a totally different type from patriarchic rulers such as Kaufman and Gerasim Kolpakovskii, the first governor-general of the Steppe (1882-1889). Troinitskii lacked charisma, had no affection for the land he governed, did not paternalistically care for the people, and relied on bureaucracy and coercion.
Troinitskii's impact on the Kazakh national movement 50 Information about Troinitskii's persecution of innocent people and lack of understanding of culture and education gradually became known to the public in the capital. In addition to the above-mentioned efforts by Skalozubov and Konshin to draw attention of the government, the St. Petersburg newspaper V mire musul´manstvo in 1911 reported his ban on meetings of Semipalatinsk Muslims on elementary education, his refusal to approve the statute of a Muslim society for enlightenment, and the abolishment of scholarships for Kazakh students. 81 Nevertheless, he was never punished by the tsarist authorities and his career was not fundamentally damaged. 51 In early 1914, at last, Troinitskii was appointed as governor of Tula province in central Russia. This was not only the realization of his longtime wish (although his father, to whom he hoped to live close, had died the previous year), but also was long-awaited good news for people in Semipalatinsk oblast. The above-mentioned article in Russkoe slovo reported that Kazakhs, who had put the blame on Troinitskii for misfortunes including even the terrible jŭt (massive death of cattle due to harsh weather in winter) in 1911-1912, were so delighted by his departure that they sacrificed 600 sheep to God. 82 52 Troinitskii's repression of Kazakh intellectuals was excessive even by the standards of the Russian Empire, but it surely was a product of its generally oppressive system and official mind. 83 On the examples examined in this paper, we can point out the following characteristics of Russian rule and interaction between imperial power and its Kazakh subjects. First, the repression was partly a result of the governors' lack of confidence in the strength of their own rule, as they had to administer the vast Kazakh steppe and its mobile nomadic population with a handful police and administrative personnel, many of whom lacked proper knowledge about local society and were involved in corruption. The arrest of dubious people, even when there was no trustworthy evidence, was a preemptive measure against destabilization. Second, there were networks of secret informers including Kazakh officials and Tatar interpreters, who provided information useful to the authorities, at the same time trapping their personal enemies. Third, there were specific bureaucrats who were especially fond of repressive measures, although the central government had mechanisms to control them to some extent. Fourth, the oppressed intellectuals did not remain passive : they knew well how the Russian bureaucracy worked, and actively petitioned the Ministry of the Interior, the governor-general of the Steppe, and deputies of the State Duma to release them or return them from exile. 
